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Sex and Sodomy and Apples and Oranges -
Does the Constitution 
Require States to Grant a Right 
to Do the Impossible? 
Jay Alan Sekulow • 
John Tuskey .. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until relatively recently, people could pretty much take for granted 
that when they talked about "marriage," they were talking about a relation-
ship- a sexual union- between a man and a woman. State marriage 
laws uniformly have embodied that understanding. Because we as a soci-
ety viewed marriage as a uniquely valuable form of human relationship, 
those laws gave special protection and benefits to couples entering that 
relationship. 
In the last two or three decades, this understanding has come under 
increasing challenge, as agitation began to attempt to change state mar-
riage laws to recognize same-sex relationships as marriages. 1 That move-
ment has made, and continues to make, little headway in the state legisla-
tures. As Lynn Wardle has noted, "[l]egislative rejection of same-sex mar-
riages is unanimous in the United States."2 Therefore, in a move remi-
* Copyright© 1998 by Jay Alan Sekulow; Chief Counsel, American Center for Law and 
Justice, Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
** Copyright© 1998 by John Tuskey; Visiting Assistant Professor, Regent University School 
of Law; Senior Research Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice. The authors thank Shannon 
Demos Woodruff, Research Counsel at the ACU, for her help in the initial preparation of this 
article. We also thank Carole Collier, staff counsel at the ACU, and the law clerks she supervises, 
for their editorial and research assistance. 
I. See sources cited at note 9, infra. 
2. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 
1996 BYU L. REV. I, 54. Wardle notes that there has been some success in efforts to legalize same-
sex domestic partnerships. In 1994, "the California Legislature passed a domestic partnership bill that 
provided official registration of same-sex couples and provided limited marital rights and privileges 
relating to hospital visitation, wills and estates, and powers of attorney." /d. at 8. Governor Wilson 
vetoed the bill. /d. According to a list compiled by Carnegie-Mellon University and available on 
Carnegie-Mellon's Internet site, forty jurisdictions offer domestic partnership plans. Twelve of those 
jurisdictions offer "some form of registration ... to non-employees." See <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-
afs/cs/user/dtw/www/companies.htm/#municipalities>. To put this in perspective, forty jurisdictions 
represent "less than one-tenth of one percent of America's 83,000 state and municipal government 
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niscent of that made by abortion proponents who became impatient with 
the pace of legislative change to abortion laws in the 1960s and 1970s, 
same-sex marriage proponents have turned to the courts. 
A. Background- Baehr v. Lewin 
In 1993, the same-sex litigation effort hit paydirt in Hawaii. In Baehr 
v. Lewin,3 the Hawaii Supreme Court became the first court in this country 
to hold, either under the federal or any state constitution, that a constitu-
tional right could exist for same-sex couples (that is, couples made up of 
two men or two women, rather than one man and one woman) to receive 
marriage licenses from the state (and thereby receive state recognition of 
their relationship as a "marriage"). Specifically, the court in Baehr held 
that refusing to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples constituted sex 
discrimination that the state must justify by showing that the refusal to is-
sue licenses to same-sex couples was "narrowly drawn" to serve "compel-
ling state interests."4 The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
trial court to give the state an opportunity to make the required showing. 
The trial court held that none of the interests the state proffered was suffi-
ciently "compelling" and enjoined the state from denying marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples;5 and the case is pending again before the su-
preme court on the state's appeal.6 The smart money is betting that if the 
Hawaii Supreme Court decides the state's appeal (which may not happen 
for reasons discussed below), the court will uphold the trial court's deci-
sion and require Hawaii to grant legal marriage status to those same-sex 
relationships whose participants seek that status. 
Despite being the first decision by any American court to suggest that 
a state must treat same-sex relationships the same way that it treats mar-
riages between men and women, the specific victory in Baehr for same-sex 
marriage proponents may be short lived (and Baehr's national influence 
less than meets the eye). The Baehr court premised its decision not on the 
United States Constitution but on a particularly distinctive equal protection 
jurisdictions." Wardle, supra note 2. Moreover, the benefits offered are generally limited. See 
Carnegie-Mellon's Internet site, noted above. 
3. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
4. /d. at 67 (plurality opinion). Although only two (of five) justices originally joined in this 
opinion, a majority of the court later joined in an order adopting the plurality opinion's reasoning. 
See id. at 74-75 (order on Motion for Reconsideration or Clarification). Because the original plurality 
opinion now represents the view of a majority of the Hawaii Supreme Court, we will refer to the 
original plurality opinion as the court's opinion and the reasoning in that opinion as the court's 
reasoning. 
5. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. 1st Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The court stayed its 
judgment pending review by the Hawaii Supreme Court. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 1996) (order granting state's Motion to Stay). 
6. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 12, 1996) (order granting defendant 
State of Hawaii's Motion to Stay). 
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provision in the Hawaii Constitution.7 A proposed amendment to the Ha-
waii Constitution will appear on the ballot in November 1998 that, if 
passed, effectively will overturn Baehr by expressly giving the Hawaii 
Legislature the power to reserve marriage status to couples of one man and 
one woman. 8 However, it appears unlikely that the Hawaii Supreme Court 
would issue its final decision before the November election. Indeed, it 
would be foolhardy for the court to decide the issue before the November 
election. Thus (assuming the amendment passes, which appears likely), 
Hawaii probably will not become the first state in this country to legally 
recognize same-sex relationships as marriages.9 
But even if Hawaii never actually licenses same-sex marriages, Baehr 
demonstrates that it is at least possible for courts to find that same-sex cou-
ples are constitutionally entitled to have states recognize their relationships 
as marriages (and thus receive all the privileges and benefits attendant to 
marital status). This issue, which has percolated in the courts and the legal 
literature for over two decades, 10 is not going to go away simply because 
7. See id. at 6. Article I, Section 5, provides in relevant part that "[n]o person shall ... be 
denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or 
be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry." 
8. The proposed amendment provides simply that "[t]he legislature shall have the power to 
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." H.R. No. 117, Haw. 19th Leg. § 2 (Haw. 1997). 
9. Because the trial court has stayed its order enjoining Hawaii from denying marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples, the state is not now issuing licenses to same-sex couples. If Hawaii 
(or any other state) ultimately is required to recognize same-sex marriages, the question will arise 
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § I, would 
require other states to recognize Hawaii same-sex marriages. Anticipating this question after Baehr, 
Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 28 U.S.C.A. §1738C (West Supp. 1997), 
which provides that states need not recognize such marriages entered into in other states. 
Constitutional issues surrounding DOMA include whether DOMA violates the Due Process Clause 
or the implied equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. CoNST. AM. V, cl. 3, and 
whether Congress has the authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to pass DOMA, see id., 
ART. IV, § I, c1. 2 ("And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such 
Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof"). Of course, until a state 
actually does recognize same-sex marriage, DOMA's constitutionality is not an issue ripe for review 
in the courts. We will not comment on DOMA further, other than to say that I) we believe DOMA 
is constitutional; and 2) the equal protection and due process arguments we canvas in this article 
would also arise in a case attacking DOMA. 
10. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 
588 (Ky. 0. App. 1973); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). As for the legal 
literature on the topic of same-sex marriage, see the thorough compendium assembled in Wardle, 
supra note 2, at 96-101. As Wardle notes, the scholarly literature on same-sex marriage has weighed 
heavily in favor of finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. /d. While incredibly thorough, 
Wardle's compendium did fail to include a series of articles that appeared in the Georgetown Law 
Journal in 1995. See Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 
(1995); Robert P. George and Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. 
L.J. 301 (1995); Hadley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions: A Reply to Macedo, 84 Geo. 
L.J. 321 (1995); and Steven Macedo, Reply to Critics, 84 GEO. L.J. 329 (1995). While these articles 
do not discuss legal and constitutional issues per se, they represent what we believe to be one of the 
most important (and best) discussions of the fundamental issues underlying those legal issues: What 
is marriage? What (if anything) is there about the nature of the committed sexual union between a 
man and a woman that justifies treating that union differently than any other intimate relationships 
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Hawaii voters overturn Baehr by constitutional amendment. Indeed, we 
expect the amendment, if passed, to be challenged on federal constitutional 
grounds; moreover, other states' refusals to license and recognize same-sex 
relationships as marriages have been challenged as well. So, despite 
Baehr's probable demise, same-sex "marriage" is an issue that is alive in 
the state courts and may very well reach the United States Supreme Court, 
as well. 11 
Arguments that the Constitution protects some right for same-sex cou-
ples to have their relationships recognized as marriage fall essentially into 
two categories: arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause protects the right of same-sex partners to marry in the legal sense; 
and arguments that not recognizing same-sex relationships as marriages 
violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the basis of sex-
ual orientation or sex. Until recently, those arguments, in whatever form, 
would not have been taken seriously for a simple reason: a state does not 
have to allow anybody to do something that is impossible. As Gerard 
Bradley put it, "[ w ]hat most people have in mind when they talk about 
between two persons? We will discuss those issues in greater depth below. 
11. Whether and when this happens will of course depend on strategic decisions by same-sex 
marriage proponents. Certainly, those proponents would like same-sex marriage now; but a proponent 
could well conclude that premature litigation and decision of the issue could have undesirable 
consequences from proponents' standpoint (not the least of which could be adverse precedent, or a 
string of adverse precedents). Thus, Cass Sunstein, who believes that prohibiting same-sex marriages 
constitutes unjust sex discrimination, nevertheless cautions courts to be careful before vindicating this 
principle because deciding the issue too soon could create a backlash harmful to the gay rights 
movement. Ultimate vindication of the principle, Sunstein believes, probably could be served better 
by a slower, more incremental approach which chips away little by little at the structures supporting 
the alleged unjust discrimination. See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. 
L. J. 1, 23-28 (1994). Sunstein's approach treats the courts as essentially a political institution 
charged with making prudential judgments about how best to implement wise public policy (though 
we doubt he would put it quite that way). If refusing to recognize same-sex marriage violates the 
equal protection clause, and if a person injured by that violation sues for redress of that injury, it 
seems to us the court's proper function would be to decide that case without regard to the larger 
effects on the gay rights movement. In any event, while we do not share Sunstein's apparent view 
of the courts' proper function or his belief that recognizing only marriages between two-sex couples 
is unjust and unconstitutional, we think his analysis should give same-sex marriage proponents food 
for thought while plotting their litigation strategies. His analysis also should caution those who seek 
to uphold the traditional understanding of marriage to be alert for the ways in which same-sex 
marriage proponents might seek to bring about incremental change through the courts (for example, 
by seeking construction of terms such as "family'' in state statutes to include same-sex partners). See, 
e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
Be that as it may, strategically-directed frontal assaults on traditional marriage laws have 
continued, which have met with initial success. In Baker v. Vermont, No. 51009-97CnC, Vt. Super. 
Ct., Dec. 19, 1997, a Vermont trial court dismissed a suit claiming a constitutional right to 
recognition of same-sex unions as marriages. The case is currently on appeal to the Vermont 
Supreme Court. The trial court opinion in Baker is available at •http:\www .. fitzhugh.com\-
samesex.htrn». But in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, 1998 WL 88743 
(Alaska Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1998), an Alaska trial court held that the Alaska Constitution 
recognizes a fundamental right to "choose one's life-partner and requires the state to demonstrate a 
compelling state interest for not recognizing same-sex unions as marriages. 
309] SEX AND SODOMY, APPLES AND ORANGES 313 
marriage is, of course, the [committed] sexual union of a man and woman. 
That kind of marriage requires complementarity and consummation."12 If 
this is what marriage (or, more precisely, the institution we have chosen to 
call marriage) really is, "same-sex marriage" is an oxymoron. Two men or 
two women cannot enter into a relationship that by definition consists of 
one man and one woman. No Ia\\- can change this reality. This is the basis 
on which a number of courts before (and after) Baehr routinely rebuffed 
claims of a right to same-sex marriage. 13 And this, essentially, is what the 
State of Hawaii sensibly argued in Baehr: 
"[T]he fact that homosexual partners cannot form a state-li-
censed marriage is not the product of impermissible discrimi-
nation" ... but rather "a function of their biologic inability as a 
couple to satisfy the definition of the status to which they as-
pire." ... "[T]he right ofpersons of the same sex to marry one 
another does not exist because marriage . . . means a special 
relc:ttionship between a man and a woman."14 
Unlike all other courts that had considered the question of same-sex 
marriage, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr found this reasoning to be 
"circular and unpersuasive,"15 an "exercise in tortured and conclusory soph-
istry."16 Underlying this conclusion necessarily was a notion of marriage at 
odds with the definition of marriage as the committed sexual union of a 
man and a woman. Marriage, according to the Baehr court, is not necessar-
ily an institution involving the sexual union of a man and a woman, but 
rather "a state-conferred legal partnership status, the existence of which 
gives rise to a multiplicity of rights and benefits reserved exclusively to 
that particular relation."17 Sexual complementarity has nothing to do with 
this notion of marriage. Indeed, for the Baehr court, sex has nothing to do 
with marriage (either sex in the sense of a person's identity as a male or 
female, or sex in the sense of sexual intercourse or even other activities 
involving the stimulation of the sexual organs). Thus, "'heterosexual' 
same-sex marriage is, in theory, not an oxymoron .... Parties to a same-
sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals."18 
To the Baehr court, marriage is "merely a [state-created] gateway to gov-
12. Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage Penalty, NAT'L REv., Jan. 26, 1998, at 33. 
13. See, e.g., Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589-90; Singer v. Hara 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 
1974); Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. App. 1982). Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 
N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1974); Callender v. Corbett, No. 296666, at 3 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 13, 1994). 
14. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 61 (Haw. 1993)(footnote ommitted). 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 63. 
17. !d. at 58. 
18. /d. at 51 n.ll. 
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emment benefits."19 So, if Billy and Bobby (or even Billy and his mother; 
nothing in Baehr's rationale would prevent this) wish to receive the bene-
fits available to married couples and are willing to comply with the neces-
sary procedures, the state should recognize them as just as married as the 
man and woman who wish to give their lives to each other and raise a fam-
ily. 
B. Implications ofBaehr 
Baehr illustrates the radical nature of the movement to require states to 
confer marriage status on same-sex relationships. That movement is noth-
ing less than an attempt to change the long-held public understanding of 
the true nature of marriage as the committed sexual union of a man and a 
woman and the understanding that this union is uniquely valuable and 
worthy of encouragement and protection. The debate over same-sex mar-
riage, then, and the issues that debate raises, are as much ontological as 
legal: What is marriage? Is there something qualitatively different about 
the committed sexual union of a man and a woman we historically have 
called "marriage" that justifies treating that union differently than any 
other close (or even intimate) relationships between persons? Or, is what 
we historically have called "marriage" just another relationship, no more 
or less worthy of encouragement and protection than any other relation-
ship? 
This is not just idle philosophical speculation bereft of practical im-
port. Any sound strategy for defending a state's right to refuse to recognize 
same-sex relationships as marriages must consider this: a judge who can-
not see any meaningful distinction between committed same-sex relation-
ships and what we historically have called marriage likely will find a right 
to same-sex marriage. Legal reasoning will probably follow philosophical 
inclination. Although we believe the arguments for any right to same-sex 
marriage do not fare well under existing legal precedent, there is probably 
sufficient precedent to provide legal cover for a right to same-sex mar-
riage. Inconvenient precedent can always be ignored, distinguished, or if 
necessary, overruled. 
Moreover, those who oppose in the courts the movement to require 
states to recognize same-sex marriages cannot forget that legal arguments 
in litigation are a part of (and only a part of) the broader cultural debate20 
19. Bradley, Marriage Penalty, supra note 10, at 34. We agree with Bradley's assessment 
that the Baehr court has not just "hazardously expanded the definition of marriage but has abolished 
marriage, legally speaking. What the Hawaii Supreme Court is setting up is better described as a 
'household' than as a marriage." /d. 
20. Our characterization of the dispute over marriage's meaning as a "debate" rather than as 
a "fight" or "struggle" or "war" is deliberate. No matter how wrong we think their cause is, same-
sex marriage proponents are not our enemies; they are our fellow citizens, worthy of full respect and 
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over the meaning of marriage. Those legal arguments help to shape that 
debate. For instance, arguments based on federalism, separation-of-pow-
ers, and the courts' proper role in a representative republic will and ought 
to play a large part in legal arguments concerning the alleged constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage. If the people of the states want to change the 
centuries-old understanding of marriage as the committed sexual relation-
ship of a man and a woman and embody any new understanding in law, 
they may do that through their elected representatives after fully debating 
and considering the ramifications. Courts have no business preempting 
that consideration (as happened in the abortion cases) by foisting their own 
new understanding of "marriage" on the people of the states. 
But arguments such as this, while powerful, are insufficient if divorced 
from any persuasive articulation of the nature of what we call marriage. As 
we have noted above, a judge who cannot see any meaningful distinction 
(or at least a sound basis for meaningful distinction) between same-sex 
relationships and marriage between a man and a woman is likely to find a 
right to same-sex marriage. Moreover, focusing legal arguments solely on 
government power may well send the wrong message in the broader cul-
tural conversation. If "marriage" is merely a government construct and its 
definition just a matter of government power, perhaps the courts cannot 
change that definition; but why can't legislatures do so? And if the mean-
ing of "marriage" is only a matter of government power to define which 
relationships do and do not count as marriages, perhaps legislatures should 
change that definition. If nothing meaningful really does distinguish tradi-
tional marriage from same-sex "marriage", it seems arbitrary to deny mari-
tal status to same-sex couples. 
In the following pages, we will explore the distinction between same-
sex "marriage" and marriage as traditionally understood as the committed 
sexual union of man and woman, and that understanding's relation to the 
various legal arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. That traditional 
understanding is sound, and helps provide a sound basis for courts to reject 
arguments for any constitutional right to same-sex marriage. If we are to 
embody a new understanding of the value of different relationships in our 
law, we should make that decision consciously as a society rather than 
have that decision forced upon us by robed masters in the courts. 
consideration. As Christians ourselves, we (the authors) must take the position that we must not only 
defeat same-sex marriage proponents, but that we must love and respect them enough to convince 
them of their error. That may not be possible, but it is essential to attempt. In any event, hatred, 
rancor, and self-righteousness have no proper place in the debate about marriage. Arguments so 
tinged are not only ineffective; they are morally wrong. Besides, we all have plenty of sins of our 
own to be concerned with. That should not prevent us from pointing out and opposing error when 
we find it (it is sophistry to label as hatred the vigorous but charitable advocacy of what one believes 
to be the truth), but it ought to keep us humble and respectful when pointing out that error. 
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II. WHAT MARRIAGE IS, AND WHY THAT MA TIERS LEGALLY 
The traditional notion of heterosexual monogamous marriage as a 
uniquely valuable form of interpersonal communion worthy of special rec-
ognition, benefits, and protection is based on the complementarity of the 
two sexes. Simply put, the (practically) "unanimous, international, and 
multicultural" perception has been that "a man and woman united in mar-
riage 'constitute a unit that is more complete, more comprehensive, more 
whole, more balanced, more complementary, and more liberating than any 
relationship of two persons of the same sex can ever be.' "21 
Lynn Wardle has expressed the traditional perception in more detail: 
The marriage license, certificate, or legal status does not 
make the heterosexual marital relationship unique, nor does 
the marriage label make committed heterosexual relations 
valuable. Instead, because the relations themselves are 
uniquely valuable they are given the preferred status and 
label of marriage. 
The heterosexual dimension of [marriage] is at the very 
core of what makes marriage a unique union and is the reason 
why marriage is so valuable to individuals and to society. The 
concept of marriage is founded on the fact that the union of 
two persons of different [sexes] creates a relationship of 
unique potential strength and inimitable potential value to 
society. The essence of marriage is the integration of a uni-
verse of [sexual] differences (profound and subtle, biological 
and cultural, psychological and genetic) associated with sexual 
identity. In the same way that "separate but equal" was a false 
premise and that racial segregation is not equivalent to racial 
integration, same-sex marriage is not equivalent to heterosex-
ual marriage. 
Thus, the definition of marriage as [a male-female] union 
is not merely a matter of arbitrary definition or semantic word 
play; it is fundamental to the concept and nature of marriage 
itself.22 
21. Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and Kulturkampf· Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture 
War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 345, 357-358 (1997) (quoting Lynn D. Wardle). 
As Dw1can notes, "no country ... in the world recognizes homosexual [relationships] as marriages." 
/d. at 357. 
22. Wardle, supra note 2, at 38-39 (footnotes omitted). We have taken the liberty of replacing 
Wardle's references to "gender" in the original with the word "sex" or a derivative. That might seem 
overly picky, but the point is important: "sex", not "gender," is the proper word to describe the fact 
of human persons' existence as male or female. The primary definition of the noun "gender" is 
grammatical: "a set of two or more categories . . . that determine agreement with or the selection 
of modifiers, referents, or grammatical forms." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 552 (2d 
College ed. 1991). "Sex", on the other hand, is an ontological term defined in pertinent part as 
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Why is this so? It is not simply because marriage serves the valuable 
purpose of procreation because only a man and woman can unite sexually 
to create new human life. After all, one may reasonably ask why we allow 
sterile couples to marry if procreation is all that distinguishes marriage 
from same-sex relationships.23 A sterile heterosexual couple's genital sex-
ual intercourse24 is not more "fruitful" (in the sense of being capable of 
generating offspring) than a same-sex couple's act of sodomy. 
One could respond to this by saying that we know that, in general, acts 
of genital sexual intercourse between a male and a female are the acts that 
can result in the reproduction of offspring. We also do not know (gener-
ally) which heterosexual couples are fertile or not. It would be an incredi-
ble intrusion into a couple's legitimate privacy to require that couple to 
submit to fertility testing or otherwise prove their fertility before recogniz-
ing their union as a marriage.25 
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 26 in 
which the Court employed similar reasoning concerning legitimate privacy 
interests to strike down a Connecticut statute prohibiting married couples 
from using contraceptives, this may well be a sufficient legal response to 
the objection concerning sterile couples.27 However, the traditional view is 
not that sterile marriages are something that we merely recognize as mar-
riages (though they really are not) because it is too intrusive to ferret out 
follows: 
I. a. The property or quality by which organisms are classified according to their 
reproductive functions. b. Either of two divisions, designated male and female, of this 
classification. 2. Males or females collectively. 3. The condition or character of being 
male or female: the physiological, functional, and psychological differences that distinguish 
the male and the female. 
Moreover, the term "gender" has been commandeered for use in signifying that real sexual 
differences are mere social constructs. Because (as we show below) the unique value of heterosexual 
marriage depends on the reality of complimentary sexual functioning, it is important to be precise 
and not to cede the definitional and rhetorical high ground to those who deny the reality of those 
differences. Therefore, those who defend the traditional understanding of heterosexual marriage 
should be careful to refer to sex as "sex", not as gender. 
23. This is the primary point raised by Macedo, supra note 10 at 278-81, when questioning 
the conclusion that male-female genital intercourse really is qualitatively different than sodomy 
(whether between couples of the same or different sexes). 
24. By "genital sexual intercourse," we mean "coition", which is defined as "physical union 
of male and female genitalia. . . leading to ejaculation of semen from the penis into the female 
reproductive tract." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 218 (1977). 
25. See infra, text accompanying notes 83-87, where we develop this argument further in 
relation to the objection that American law allows married couples to contracept, abort, and engage 
in sodomy, all of which seem (and indeed are) contrary to the understanding of marriage we will 
set forth. 
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
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infertility. Rather, the traditional view always has been that unions be-
tween sterile heterosexual couples, even knowingly entered, are no less 
marriages than unions between fertile couples. 28 Thus, for instance, while 
the law generally has considered failure and inability to consummate a 
marriage by genital sexual intercourse to constitute grounds for annulment, 
the law has not considered infertility a bar to marriage or a ground for an-
nulment.29 
The heterosexual sterile couple cannot reproduce, but the spouses can 
perform acts of genital sexual intercourse. Their union is still properly con-
sidered a marriage. So the unique nature of marriage must transcend the 
fact that marriage serves the very valuable end of procreation. Marriage is 
not properly seen merely as a means to any end but as an end in itself. 
As Wardle's observation implies, the uniqueness of marriage is related 
to the complementarity of the two sexes. When a man and a woman unite 
sexually in marriage, they create a union that cannot exist in any other rela-
tionship. Unlike any other form of human relationship, "marriage is an ir-
reducible form of interpersonal communion grounded in the complemen-
tarity of reproductive functioning, even where reproduction for this or that 
couple is impossible."30 
What is it about the "complementarity of reproductive functioning that 
separates heterosexual marriage from other relationships (and marital sex-
ual intercourse from nonmarital intercourse or other orgasmic acts per-
fmmed on each other by partners, whether of the opposite or same sex)? A 
number of modem natural law theorists (most notably Germain Grisez, 
John Finnis, Robert George, and Gerard Bradley) have been working out a 
convincing answer to this questionY This answer, while consistent with 
classical Christian (or at least Catholic) teaching on marriage, is philosoph-
ical, not theological, and makes no appeals to religious authority. As 
Finnis notes, this answer has roots in the writings of ancient pre-Christian 
28. Even St. Augustine, who seems to have seen marriage between fertile couples as a good 
because those marriages serve the good of procreation and rearing of offspring, held this view. Saint 
Augustine, De bono coniugalia (The good of marriage) (9.9), in ST. AUGUSTINE, TREATISES ON 
MARRIAGE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 21-22 (Charles T. Wilcox, et al, trans. 1955). Augustine wrote, "it 
is a good to marry . . since it is good to be the mother of a family." !d. But in an earlier portion 
of the same treatise, Augustine identified another good of marriage, the "natural companionship 
betwe.en the two sexes." !d. (3.3), at 12. This natural companionship led Augustine to see that the 
marriage of sterile (elderly) couples was indeed marriage. !d. 
29. See George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 307-09 & nn.23-27. 
30. Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review Essay of Making Men Moral, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 695 (1996) (emphasis added). 
31. See 2 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Living a Christian Life 555-74, 633-
80 (1993); John M. Finnis, Law. Morality, and "Sexual Orientation', 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 
!055-69 (1994); George & Bradley, supra note 10. 
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philosophers and first century non-Christian philosophers such as Plato, 
Aristotle, Plutarch, and Musonius Rufus.32 
It is not necessary for our purpose to sketch all the details of this natu-
ral law explanation of marriage as grounded in reproductive complemen-
tarity.33 A brief sketch of the major points of the explanation will suffice to 
show the qualitative difference between the committed sexual union of 
man and woman (marriage) and other human relationships. We begin with 
the premise that marriage is a free and complete giving of the two spouses 
to each other.34 When two people freely consent to give themselves to each 
other, they create an intercommunion of their whole persons - mind, 
spirit, and body. This insight is reflected, as Finnis notes, in Plutarch's ob-
servation in the early second century that the union of husband and wife 
creates an "integral amalgamation" of their two lives. 35 
This "integral amalgamation" or, "two-in-one-flesh" communion is 
actualized and experienced by the couple when they perform genital inter-
course. In other words, genital intercourse literally makes two people one 
in a way that no other act can. How is this so? No man or woman can re-
produce by him or herself; only the mated pair can perform the single 
function of reproduction. Grisez explains: 
Though a male and a female are complete individuals with 
respect to other functions - for example, nutrition, sensation 
and locomotion - with respect to reproduction they are only 
potential parts of a mated pair, which is the complete organ-
ism capable of reproducing sexually. Even if the mated pair is 
sterile, intercourse, provided it is the reproductive behavior 
characteristic of the species, makes the copulating male and 
female one organism.36 
Since human persons are unities of mind, soul, and body, their bodies 
- the biological reality of the human being - are part of, and not merely 
instruments of, their whole persons. When a husband and wife unite bio-
32. See Finnis, supra note 31, at 1062-63. 
33. For a much fuller treatment, see the sources cited supra note 30. 
34. See George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 312 ("Marriage is a 'reflexive' good; it includes 
the free choices of the party's consent"). 
35. Finnis, supra note 31, at 1064 n.9 & 1065 (quoting Plutarch, Erotikos 769 F; Coniugalia 
Praecepta 142 F). Plutarch's observation foreshadows the insight of Pope John Paul II, who has 
referred to marriage as "a great project: fusing your persons to the point of becoming one flesh." 
Quoting John Paul II, Address to Young Married Couples at Taranto (October 1989), quoted in 
Finnis, supra note 29, at 1065 n.43. However, this is not a uniquely Catholic (or even more 
generally Christian) insight; as Finnis notes, Plutarch's writing on this subject was "certainly free 
from Judeo-Christian influence." !d. at I 062. 
36. Germain Grisez, The Christian Family as Fulfillment of Sacramental Marriage, Paper 
Delivered to the Society of Christian Ethics Annual Conference (Sept. 9, 1995), at 6, quoted in 
George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 311-12. 
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logically by acts of genital intercourse, therefore, they unite personally. 
Thus, by acts of genital intercourse, a husband and wife experience and 
actualize their marriage as the complete giving of themselves to one an-
other; they truly do experience union in mind, spirit, and body.37 Genital 
intercourse renews the self-giving and interpersonal communion that con-
stitute marriage. Again, Finnis notes how Plutarch captured this insight in 
the early second century: 
In the case of lawful wives, physical union is the beginning of 
friendship, a sharing, as it were, in great mysteries. [The] 
pleasure is short [or unimportant: mikron] but the respect and 
kindness and mutual affection and loyalty that daily spring 
from it [conjugal sex] ... proves that Solon was a very experi-
enced legislator of marriage laws. He provided that a man 
should consort with his wife not less than three times a month 
-not for the pleasure, surely, but as cities renew their mutual 
agreements from time to time, just so he must have wished 
this to be a renewal ofmarriage.38 
Again at this point, one might point to our friends the sterile cou-
ple to raise an objection: if actual reproduction is impossible, how can the 
sterile couple's genital intercourse be "reproductive behavior"? Inter-
course by a sterile couple, one might say, is no more behavior "suitable for 
generation"39 than pointing an unloaded gun at someone and pulling the 
trigger is "behavior suitable for murder."40 If so, then the sterile couple's 
marriage is a sham, or genital intercourse does not have the unitive signifi-
cance that we (along with Grisez, Finnis, George, Bradley, and most who 
adhere to the traditional view of marriage) believe it has. Marriage as a 
"one-flesh union" is, at best, a metaphor. 
37. See Finnis, supra note 31, at 1066; George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 311 n.32 
("males and females [] who unite genitally in marital acts really do unite biologically (and, because 
- as Finnis has observed ... - the biological reality of human beings is part of their personal 
reality, they unite personally)"). 
38. Finnis, supra note 31, at 1063-64 n.37 (quoting Plutarch, Erotikos 769). None of this is 
to say, of course, that marital intercourse ought not be pleasurable, or that spouses ought not desire 
their intercourse to be pleasurable. The point is that the pleasure is secondary; the significance of 
marital intercourse is that it renews the couple's marriage by making them physically - and 
therefore, personally - one. 
39. Finnis, supra note 31, at 1066 n.46 ("Biological union between humans is the 
inseminatory union of male genital organ with female genital organ; in most circumstances it does 
not result in generation, but it is the behavior that unites biologically because it is the behavior 
which, as behavior, is suitable for generation"). 
40. Macedo, supra note 10, at 280 poses this analogy. See generally id. at 278-80 for a more 
extended discussion. 
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We believe the murder analogy fails. All reproduction is, as George 
and Bradley note, a "complex biological function."41 This function entails 
two aspects: a behavioral aspect (that is, penile penetration of the vagina 
and ejaculation of semen into the reproductive tract) and a non-behavioral 
aspect (for example, the presence of sperm in the semen, the presence of 
an ovum, and the sperm's ability to reach and penetrate the ovum). When a 
sterile couple engages in genital intercourse that results in ejaculation of 
semen into the reproductive tract, that couple is performing the behavior 
necessary for reproduction even if nonbehavioral factors prevent the gener-
ation of new life. 
Compare the murder analogy. One could characterize committing mur-
der with a gun as a "complex function" and break that function down into 
behavioral and non-behavioral aspects. Among the behavioral aspects are 
aiming the gun and pulling the trigger, but also (first and foremost) load-
ing the gun. Suppose a person aims and fires, but forgot to load. That per-
son has omitted an essential part of the behavior necessary (suitable) for 
murder. But suppose that same person loads, aims, and fires, but, much to 
his chagrin, the firing mechanism malfunctions (or the victim is wearing a 
bullet-proof vest). That person would be performing behavior suitable for 
murder; something other than his behavior has thwarted his efforts. The 
sterile couple is like the person who fired the malfunctioning gun: nothing 
they have done has thwarted the full completion of the reproductive pro-
cess (that is, the generation of new life). It is not as if a man and a woman 
fail or forget to "load" sperm in the man's semen or ova into the woman's 
reproductive tract.42 Thus, George and Bradley correctly state that a sterile 
couple's "intercourse constitutes reproductive functioning, even if the pro-
cess of which it is a part is, due to non behavioral factors, incomplete. This 
is why we easily recognize the mating of animals we know to be sterile as 
mating, and not as failed attempts to mate. "43 
Therefore, Grisez's point still holds. Because the mated pair is the 
only organism capable of reproduction, a married couple performing geni-
tal intercourse - the only behavior suitable for reproduction - literally 
41. George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 312. 
42. The couple using contraception, on the other hand, may be said to be in the position of 
the person who has failed to load his gun (or, has deliberately unloaded his gun). If so, it would 
seem to follow that contracepted sex may well not constitute the behavior suitable for reproduction 
required to make the couple truly one. Thoughtful scholars have disagreed about whether 
contraception vitiates the unitive (and therefore marital) quality of spousal genital intercourse. See 
id. at 310 n.30. Even if contraception does vitiate the marital quality of these acts, the legal 
significance of that conclusion is another matter. We discuss this question infra at text accompanying 
notes 83-87. 
43. /d. at 312-13 (footnote omitted). George and Bradley offer other reasons to defend this 
conclusion. See id. We find these reasons persuasive, but we need not discuss them. 
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do become "one flesh" and experience and actualize their marriage com-
mitment, even if they are unable to generate new life by that act. 
No other act, including sodomy, has this unitive significance. This in-
cludes sodomy between spouses.44 Only genital intercourse is the type of 
reproductive behavior that literally makes the man and the woman one 
"complete organism capable of reproducing sexually." Unlike reproduc-
tion, merely inducing orgasm is a biological function that does not require 
a mated pair. A person can quite easily induce an orgasm by masturbating. 
That the person chooses to involve another person in inducing his orgasm 
(for example, by an act of sodomy) may make the couple feel closer emo-
tionally, or give them pleasure; it does not however make them one func-
tioning biological unit. It does not literally unify them. 
As George and Bradley note, this explanation of marriage as rooted in 
the complementarity of reproductive functioning makes sense of the tradi-
tional (though perhaps not universal) legal requirement that consummation 
by genital intercourse is an essential element of marriage and that failure to 
consummate is a ground for annulment.45 We believe that this explanation, 
if correct, also provides a sound basis for rejecting the legal arguments for 
a right to same-sex marriage. The Constitution does not "require 'things 
which are different in fact ... to be treated in law as though they were the 
same.' "46 The institution our society commonly has called marriage - the 
committed sexual union of a man and a woman- is qualitatively different 
than same-sex relationships. Married couples are capable of truly becom-
ing "two-in-one flesh"; same-sex couples, no matter how much they may 
desire to, are incapable of doing so. Same-sex couples simply cannot per-
form the act of genital intercourse that allows them to actualize and ex peri-
ence true one-flesh union. 
B. The Loving Analogy 
Arguments that the Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex 
marriage simply deny the difference between marriage and other relation-
ships, and in effect deny the significance of reproductive complementarity 
for the union between man and woman. Take, for instance, arguments that 
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages discriminates on the basis of sex. 
44. This is an important point. The argument we have been sketching does not single out 
homosexual acts for special opprobrium. Nonmarital sex acts by anybody, even spouses, lack the 
ability to actualize marriage. This includes extramarital intercourse, which cannot actualize the 
personal communion of marriage because there is no personal communion to actualize. This has been 
reflected in the traditional legal requirement that sodomy, no matter how pleasurable or expressive 
of care, affection, etc., does not consummate marriage. See George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 308. 
45. See id. 
46. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981). 
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These arguments rely on an analogy to Loving v. Virginia.41 In Loving, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statutory scheme that prevented 
whites and blacks from marrying each other. Notably, Virginia law prohib-
ited interracial marriage involving only whites: while blacks and other 
races were free to intermarry, whites could marry only whites.48 This, cou-
pled with the overt racial classification in the statute and the clear history 
of the statute's purpose to protect white "racial integrity,"49 led the Court 
to conclude "that the racial classifications must stand on their own justifi-
cation, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy,''50 and struck 
down the statute as an unconstitutional racial classification.51 
Same-sex marriage proponents make two arguments based on Loving. 
First, Loving, a white man could have married a white woman, but he 
could not marry Jeter, a black woman. Likewise, Billy may marry Sue, but 
Billy may not marry Bob. Therefore just as the Virginia law in Loving dis-
criminated because of race, state-laws refusing to recognize same-sex rela-
tionships as marriages discriminate because of sex. 52 
The obvious rejoinder to this argument is that state marriage laws treat 
men and women alike: Billy may no more marry Bobby than Sue may 
marry Linda. Thus, these laws discriminate against neither men nor 
women. However, Virginia made a similar argument in Loving: 
"[B]ecause its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the White and 
the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite 
their reliance on racial classification, do not constitute an invidious dis-
crimination based upon race."53 Yet, the Court rejected this argument.54 
Therefore, the argument goes, it must follow that just as miscegenation 
discriminates because of race, marriage laws discriminate because of sex. 55 
47. 388 U.S. I (1966). In Sunstein's words, Loving is "the most aptly titled case in the entire 
history of American Jaw." Sunstein, supra note 11, at 17. Although we agree with little else in 
Sunstein's article, we must admit that this observation is right on the mark! 
48. See 288 U.S. at II & n.ll (Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white 
persons; "while Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite ... Negroes, Orientals, and 
any other racial class may intermarry without statutory interference"). 
49. A significant part of that history came from the Virginia Supreme Court. In Nairn v. 
Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), the court upheld the miscegenation statute, finding that 
Virginia could legitimately "preserve the racial integrity of its citizens" and prevent "the corruption 
of blood," "a mongrel race of citizens," and the "obliteration of racial pride." The Supreme Court 
understandably found those statements to be "obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White 
Supremacy." 388 U.S. at 7. 
SO. 388 U.S. at II (footnote omitted). 
51. /d. at 12. 
52. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 208 (1994). This is essentially the argument the Hawaii 
Supreme Court accepted in Baehr. See 852 P.2d at 67-68. 
53. 388 U.S. at 8. 
54. !d. at 8-10. 
55. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68. 
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This argument strips Loving's conclusion from its context. Unlike state 
marriage laws that treat women and men alike, the Virginia miscegenation 
statute treated whites and blacks differently. In Virginia, Mr. Loving, a 
white man, could only marry a white woman; and Ms. Jeter, a black 
woman could marry any man but a white man.56 The Virginia statute did 
not treat the races equally; it more strictly limited white persons' marriage 
options. This legal disadvantage to whites existed to serve a regime de-
signed specifically to segregate whites and blacks and preserve the "integ-
rity" of the white race in the interest of "White Supremacy". Given this 
context, it is not surprising that Cass Sunstein, (who believes that marriage 
laws discriminate because of sex), nevertheless has concluded that the 
"Billy can marry Sue but not Bobby" analogy to Loving, "[u]nder current 
law gets nowhere .... There is no sex discrimination because women and 
men are treated exactly the same. "57 
Sunstein himself believes that state marriage laws discriminate against 
women because just as the miscegenation ban in Loving was the product of 
a desire to maintain White Supremacy, state marriage laws are "a product 
of a desire to maintain a system of gender hierarchy, a system that same-
sex marriage tends to undermine by complicating traditional and still-influ-
ential ideas about the 'natural difference' between men and women."58 
Sunstein argues that state marriage laws that refuse to recognize same-sex 
relationships as marriages "have much the same connection to gender caste 
as bans on racial intermarriage have on racial caste"59 because "miscege-
nation laws attempt to keep blacks and whites apart, while bans on same-
sex relations attempt to keep men and women together."60 Thus, 
[S]ame-sex marriages are banned because of what they do 
to - because of how they unsettle - gender categories. Per-
haps same-sex marriages are banned because they complicate 
traditional gender thinking, showing that the division of hu-
man beings into two simple kinds is part of sex-role stereotyp-
ing, however true it is that women and men are "different". 61 
Thus, like the ban on interracial marriage, "the ban on same-sex marriages 
may well be doomed by a constitutionally illegitimate purpose. The ban 
56. Loving, 388 U.S. at II & n.ll. 
57. Sunstein, supra note II, at 18-19. 
58. /d. at 16. 
59. /d. 
60. /d. at 20, n.65. 
61. /d. at 20-21. 
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has everything to do with constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes about 
the appropriate roles of men and women."62 
This argument is interesting, but it has several problems, not the least 
of which (for the tactical purposes of same-sex marriage proponents) is its 
veiled insult to women. What Sunstein is telling women, in effect, is that 
by marrying under present conditions (that is, at a time when the law 
would not recognize her choice to "marry" a woman as a real marriage) 
they are helping to prop up a social structure that forces them to remain 
second-class citizens. Apparently, the woman who falls in love with and 
desires to marry a man (exercising what she thinks is her own free will) 
and believes that marital union is truly a good that will contribute to her 
well-being and flourishing, is too dull-witted to realize that by propping up 
the patriarchy she is acting contrary to her own best interests. To be fair, 
Sunstein also thinks that we are all - women and men - victims of the 
sexual caste.63 So, perhaps not only women who marry are too dull-witted 
to understand how they are hurting themselves- we all are! 
Moreover, Sunstein's theory boils down to an empirical claim that 
marriage, as we know it, harms women. That will be a hard, perhaps im-
possible, claim to prove. Given that most women seem to have missed this 
connection, it would not be surprising to find that "[j]udges may find it 
difficult to understand how denying two gay men the right to marry is 
driven by an ideology that oppresses straight women.' "64 
For our purposes, however, the biggest problem with Sunstein's argu-
ment is that it can succeed only if- indeed, makes sense only if- what 
we consider to be important sexual differences are nothing but sex-role 
stereotypes imposed by the culture. It may be true that some of what we 
consider to be "natural" differences between the sexes really are learned 
behavior and ought not justify legal distinctions between the sexes. 65 (This 
itself is an empirical claim that may be difficult to prove, as Sunstein him-
self admits. 66) But if what we said earlier about marriage as one-flesh un-
62. !d. at 21. 
63. See id. at 22-23 ("The legal and social taboo on homosexuality" including the refusal to 
recognize same-sex relationships as marriages. "might well be damaging to both men and women, 
heterosexual and homosexual alike, though of course in very different ways and to quite different 
degrees"). 
64. Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to Sunstein, 70 IND. 
L.J. 29, 33 n.27, (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1419, 1509-10 (1993)). 
65. Sunstein is surely correct when he notes that not even all real differences justify different 
legal and social treatment. See Sunstein, supra note II, at 14-15. Thus, for instance the fact that 
blacks and whites are different in skin color should have no bearing on how the law treats blacks 
and whites. And the fact that men generally are larger and stronger than women should have no 
bearing on whether women can be lawyers or CPA's. While we agree with Sunstein concerning this 
principle, we believe that he simply glosses over and ignores the significance of reproductive 
complementarity and its conclusive importance to the question of marriage. 
66. See id. at 15-16. 
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ion is true, then the difference that matters for marriage - the reproduc-
tive complementarity of men and women- is conclusive for excluding 
same-sex relationships from the universe of marriage. Committed sexual 
union between a man and a woman is different in kind from any other rela-
tionship, for only in that union can two distinct individuals literally be-
come one. Same-sex couples, as a matter of biological fact, cannot engage 
in the only behavior that can consummate and actualize the marriage union 
by literally making the two into one. 
Thus, any analogy to Loving breaks down. Richard Loving was a man. 
Mildred Jeter was a woman. Presumably, they were capable of consum-
mating their marriage. Skin color has absolutely nothing to do with this 
ability (despite the trial judge's quaint comments that "Almighty God" 
decreed that whites not marry blacks)67 • Thus, it was invidious discrimina-
tion to prevent them from marrying. Billy and Bobby, on the other hand, 
cannot consummate their "marriage." Therefore, it is not invidious dis-
crimination to refuse to call their relationship a "marriage," no matter how 
much they wish it to be one. 
C. Due Process and a Fundamental Right to Same-Sex Marriage 
Arguments for a due process "right" to same-sex marriage also must 
assume that marriage is something other than the sexual union between a 
man and a woman. The Supreme Court has stated that the right to marry is 
a "fundamental" right;68 therefore a state generally must justify laws that 
prohibit marriage by showing that those laws serve a compelling state in-
terest. 69 However, same-sex marriage proponents should get little mileage 
from these cases, since the Court historically has tied the fundamental right 
to marriage to activities associated with procreating and raising children.70 
In fact, the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwice' dismissed the argu-
ment that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to perform homo-
sexual sodomy with the curt comment that "no connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the 
other has been demonstrated. "72 
67. See 388 U.S. at 3. 
68. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Zablocki 
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
69. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ I 0.1.2 (1997). 
70. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 ("[l]t would make little sense to recognize a right 
of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter 
the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society .... [l)f appellee's's right to 
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the 
State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.") (citations and footnote omitted). 
71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
72. /d. at 191. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 35. 
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Another line of Supreme Court cases may, however, provide a better 
avenue of attack. In his dissent in Bowers, Justice Blackmun suggested 
that the reason the Court has protected the right to marry and enter into 
sexual and family relationships is not so much because those rights con-
tribute to the general welfare, but because the choice to enter into those 
relationships is central to a person's dignity and autonomy.73 This is con-
sistent with the Court's statement in Eisenstadt v. Baird'4 that "the marital 
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but 
an association of two individuals."15 Eisenstadt foreshadowed Justice 
Blackmun's suggestion in his Bowers dissent that we protect marriage to 
protect the choice of the spouses to enter into marriage and therefore the 
autonomy of those two persons. This, in tum, suggests that the value of 
marriage lies not in anything unique about that institution, but in the 
choice of two people to live together in a life of sexual intimacy. 
This reasoning came to full flower in the famous "mystery passage" in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,16 in which 
the Court stated: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education. Our cases recognize 
"the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child." Our precedents ''have respected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter." These mat-
ters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State. 77 
73. 478 U.S. at 204-05. For a penetrating (and critical) analysis of Justice Blackmun's Bowers 
dissent, see Gerard V. Bradley, Remaking the Constitution: A Critical Reexamination of the Bowers 
v. Hardwick Disse1ll, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501 (1990). 
74. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
75. !d. at 453 (emphasis added). 
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
77. !d. at 851 (Joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, Jj.)(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
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If "marriage" is merely an association of two individuals, valuable primar-
ily because of the choice of two people to enter into that relationship, and 
if liberty really is the right to make intimate and personal choices that de-
fine one's own concept of meaning and existence, it would seem to follow 
that two men have the right to marry each other. After all, two men's deci-
sion to enter into a committed intimate relationship seems (at least on the 
surface) to be as personal and intimate as the choice of a man and a 
woman to marry. 
If we take Casey at its word, what the Court really has created is a con-
stitutional right to define one's own moral universe. If one's own moral 
universe includes the notion that men really can marry men, then Casey 
appears to say that the due process clause protects choices based on that 
notion.78 In fact, it is hard to think of any principled limit to the right 
Casey potentially created. 
Despite this, it is doubtful that a due process argument based on 
Eisenstadt and Casey is likely to succeed. First, the specter of Bowers v. 
Hardwice9 still looms large. Casey, though perhaps doctrinally inconsis-
tent with Bowers (given that Casey essentially adopted the reasoning of the 
Bowers dissent) did not purport to overrule Bowers. 
Second, a majority of the Court indicated last term in Glucksberg v. 
Washington, 80 that it was not willing to extend Casey's reasoning (and the 
Court's own privacy/liberty jurisprudence) much further than it already has 
extended. Glucksberg rejected the argument that a mentally competent, 
terminally-ill patient has a fundamental right to have a physician's assis-
tance in committing suicide. 81 One might suppose that the decision 
whether and how to end one's life is one of the more "personal and inti-
mate" decisions a p~rson might make concerning his own "concept of exis-
tence." But the majority in Glucksberg interpreted (perhaps somewhat dis-
ingenuously) Casey's mystery passage as merely describing "in a general 
way and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions 
that this Court has identified as ... protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."82 Moreover, the Court placed great emphasis on the "consistent and 
almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right [to as-
78. For a critical, philosophically informed critique of Casey's mystery passage and the 
Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence in general, see David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of 
Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975 (1992). Smolin characterizes the 
Casey view of liberty as "a cheerful interpretation of Sartre's existentialism." /d. at 981. 
79. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
80. 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997). 
81. See id. at 2271. 
82. /d. at 2271 (footnote omitted). This interpretation of Casey might strike one as somewhat 
fanciful. If the Casey joint opinion merely was describing other specific constitutionally protected 
activities, the joint opinion's authors used rather strange language to make that point. 
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sisted suicide]."83 A similarly consistent and almost universal tradition has 
long rejected the notion that same-sex relationships are marriages. 84 
Again, however, note how the argument for recognizing same-sex 
marriages depends on dismissing the biological reality that separates the 
committed sexual union of man and woman from same-sex relationships. 
The due process argument hinges on the notion that marriage is not really 
a one-flesh union consummated and actualized by acts of genital inter-
course which literally do unite the couple as a single organism. Instead, 
marriage is just the association of two individuals that is valuable because 
it reflects the choice of its participants to associate with each other. To ac-
cept what we have argued as the reality of marriage is necessarily to reject 
the due process argument for recognizing same-sex relationships as mar-
nages. 
D. Is It Arbitrary to Allow Non-Marital Acts by Married Heterosexuals, 
But Not Recognize Gay Marriage? 
It is, however, possible to accept all we have said about marriage, yet 
still maintain that present-day marriage laws should recognize same-sex 
relationships (and grant them the benefits that go along with recognition). 
A person could accept that the reproductive complementarity of man and 
woman really does make their union unique and that acts of sexual inter-
course between spouses (behavior of the reproductive type) really do make 
them one flesh in a way no other acts can. The response to this would be, 
in effect, so what? That's not the kind of union your marriage laws actu-
ally protect. The law allows couples to thwart reproduction by using con-
traception; the law even allows them to kill their offspring after they are 
conceived. The law does nothing to prevent married couples from perform-
ing the same kind of acts (sodomy, mutual masturbation) that you hold are 
unable to unite same-sex couples. In short, you reserve the full cornucopia 
of orgasmic delights to opposite-sex couples, and recognize and protect 
relationships that same-sex couples are as capable of entering into as 
opposite-sex couples. This is arbitrary and unjust. 
For those who take the view of marriage we have presented, this argu-
ment has (and should have) considerable force. It does seem arbitrary, as 
Steven Macedo put it, to impose restrictions on "a ... minority ... that the 
majority is unwilling to impose on itself."85 Those who decry homosexual 
83. /d. at 2269; See generally id. at 2262-67 (discussing the history of suicide and assisted 
suicide prohibitions); 2267-69 (discussing the importance of history and tradition in substantive due 
process analysis). 
84. Although, to be sure, the supposed right to have an abortion has no better historical or 
legal pedigree than the right to commit suicide or to marry someone of the same-sex. 
85. Macedo, supra note 10, at 277. 
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activity also should decry the unfortunate frequency of other nonmarital 
acts in our society. 
Yet, we believe this argument is not sufficient to require recognizing 
same-sex relationships as marriages. The differential legal treatment re-
ferred to is not arbitrary. Men and women are capable of entering and actu-
alizing the one-flesh union that is marriage. Same-sex couples are not. 
True, the law generally allows spouses to commit acts like sodomy. But 
the fact that the law does not inquire into the sexual or contraceptive prac-
tices (assuming that contraception vitiates the marital nature of inter-
course) of married couples is a prudential decision reflecting the judgment 
that marriage needs a certain amount of privacy to prosper. Intruding into 
married couples' sexual practices may well damage this privacy and thus 
ultimately cause more harm to a marriage (and the institution of marriage) 
than the good that might result from deterring contraception or sodomy.86 
In fact, this was the very reasoning the Supreme Court used in 
Griswold v. Connecticuf'1 to strike down Connecticut's law that prohibited 
married couples from using contraceptives. The Court waxed philosophic 
about the nature of marriage as a "noble" institution, "a coming together 
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of 
being sacred. "88 Marriage, in the Court's view, required an appropriate 
zone of privacy to flourish and prosper; Connecticut's law, in the Court's 
view, violated that zone. As the Court noted, Griswold 
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of 
contraceptives ... seeks to achieve its goals by means having a 
maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] 
relationship .... Would we allow the police to search the sa-
cred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use 
of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of 
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.89 
In Griswold, the Court no doubt exceeded its power; it was clearly leg-
islating. But (assuming for now the Court had the power to legislate), the 
Court's conclusion was reasonable. It is hard to deny a real legislature the 
power to reach essentially the same conclusion concerning how far to in-
trude into a married couple's sexual practices. Therefore, the fact that the 
law does not prohibit married partners from performing nonmarital acts 
86. See George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 319-20. 
87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
88. /d. at 486. 
89. /d. at 485-86. For further discussion of this interpretation of Griswold, see Gerard V. 
Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351-53 (1993). 
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should not provide a sufficient basis to require states to recognize same-
sex relationships as marriages. 
V. CONCLUSION-- THE STAKES OF THE DEBATE 
Perhaps the law does not now require recognizing same-sex relation-
ships as marriages. Perhaps there is a real difference between the commit-
ted sexual union of a man and woman, and other relationships. But so 
what if we choose to call same-sex relationships marriages? How does that 
harm anybody? Isn't this just a matter of semantics? No. As legal philoso-
pher Joseph Raz has noted regarding monogamy, 
[s]upporting valuable forms of life is a social rather than an 
individual matter. Monogamy, assuming that it is the only 
morally valuable form of marriage, cannot be practiced by an 
individual. It requires a culture which recognizes it, and which 
supports it through the public's attitude and through its for-
mal institutions.90 
Robert George understands Raz to be arguing "that without this social 
recognition and support, the (uniquely valuable) option of monogamous 
marriage will be practically unavailable for large numbers of people in a 
given society," since "[a] framework of expectations and understandings 
that will profoundly affect individual members of a society and their rela-
tionships with one another will be shaped decisively by a society's com-
mitment (or lack of commitment) to the ideal of monogamous marriage."91 
In other words, the surrounding culture, including that culture's legal 
norms, helps to shape people's understanding of what are or are not truly 
valuable forms of life and relationships. 
As with monogamy, so with marriage generally. Raz has noted that 
such changes as same-sex marriage and homosexual families "will not be 
confined to adding new options to the familiar heterosexual monogamous 
family. They will change the character of that family. If these changes take 
root in our culture then the familiar marriage relations will disappear."92 
Why is this so? Why not call committed same-sex relationships mar-
riages? After all, those who believe in marriage as uniquely the sexual un-
ion of man and woman will still be free to marry in that sense, and to re-
gard their relationships as unique, special, and superior. How does recog-
90. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986). 
91. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 165 (1993). 
92. RAZ, supra note 18 (quoted in Gerard V. Bradley, Pluralistic Perfectionism: A Review 
of Making Men Moral, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 695 (1996)). Bradley notes that Raz "ventured 
no moral evaluation of the prospect" that homosexual families would become accepted in our law 
and culture. See 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. at 695. 
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nizing same-sex marriage deprive them of that choice or harm those people 
in any other way? 
Gerard Bradley offers a trenchant response to this objection: 
Why not just call or treat gay relationships as "marriage" in 
scare quotes or with an asterisk? Because for a time straight 
and gay marriage might co-exist in the law and in popular con-
sciousness as somehow superior and inferior forms. But they 
will not for long. Sooner rather than later, persons will won-
der, superior and inferior versions of what? The ranking pre-
sumes a common metric or a genre embracing both species. If 
the genre is the traditional one, gay partnerships are not infe-
rior versions of it at all, but morally indistinguishable from 
what the tradition has always considered an affront against 
marriage: cohabitation. If marriage and gay partnership are 
variations on a single theme, some new ideal of domestic part-
nership has replaced marriage, one which has conclusively cut 
off our understanding of marriage as, in some decisive way, a 
community grounded in the complementarity of reproductive 
functioning. 93 
Thus, as George notes, "the presence or absence of a culture's commit-
ment to, and support for, a social form such as monogamous marriage will 
profoundly shape the options that people will typically understand them-
selves to have- and the choices that they will actually make- in mor-
ally important areas of their lives."94 
By giving special status, benefits, and protection to heterosexual mo-
nogamous marriage, we as a society demonstrate our commitment to that 
institution as a uniquely valuable form of human interaction and commu-
nion (both for those married and for society as a whole). To give the same 
status, benefits, and protection to relationships that do not share the char-
acteristics that make heterosexual monogamous marriage uniquely valu-
able- that is to call something "marriage" that is not really marriage - will 
at best blur the message that marriage is uniquely valuable, and probably 
over time cut off our understanding of marriage as uniquely valuable. If we 
as a society wish to do that, we should do it consciously after full debate 
and not by dictate of five platonic guardians who have been convinced by 
lawyers that sexual intercourse and sodomy- apples and oranges- really 
are the same thing. 
93. Bradley, supra note 21, at 695-96. 
94. GEORGE, supra note 91, at 166. See also George & Bradley, supra note 10, at 307. 
